We consider the secure quantum communication over a network with the presence of a malicious adversary who can eavesdrop and contaminate the states. The network consists of noiseless quantum channels with the unit capacity and the nodes which applies noiseless quantum operations. As the main result, when the maximum number m 1 of the attacked channels over the entire network uses is less than a half of the network transmission rate m 0 (i.e., m 1 < m 0 /2), our code implements secret and correctable quantum communication of the rate m 0 − 2m 1 by using the network asymptotic number of times. Our code is universal in the sense that the code is constructed without the knowledge of the specific node operations and the network topology, but instead, every node operation is constrained to the application of an invertible matrix to the basis states. Moreover, our code requires no classical communication. Our code can be thought of as a generalization of the quantum secret sharing.
node operations, and construct an end-to-end code between them. The use of the end-to-end code is important because it generates the redundancy which is necessary for the security guarantee. By this method, Cai and Yeung [10] first devised a classical network code which guarantees the secrecy of the communication. Secure classical network codes by this method have been further studied in [11] , [12] .
The other method for secure classical network codes is to use only an end-to-end code without controlling node operations. In this method, the node operations are not directly controlled but constrained, and an end-to-end code is constructed with the knowledge of the constraints without specific knowledge of the underlying node operations and the network topology. Although the codes [13] [14] [15] [16] by this method do not control the node operations, which differs from the original definition of the network code in [1] , these codes are also called network codes. By this method, Jaggi et al. [13] constructed a classical network code with asymptotic error correctability. In the paper [13] , all node operations are not controlled but constrained to be linear operations, and the code is universal in the sense that the code is constructed independently of the network topology and the particular node operations. When the transmission rate m 0 of the network and the maximum rate m 1 of the malicious injection satisfy m 1 < m 0 , the code in [13] achieves the correctability with the rate m 0 − m 1 by asymptotic n uses of the network. Furthermore, Hayashi et al. [16] extended the result in [13] so that the secrecy is also guaranteed: when previously defined m 0 , m 1 , and the information leakage rate m 2 satisfy m 1 + m 2 < m 0 , the classical network code in [16] achieves the secrecy and the correctability with the rate m 0 − m 1 − m 2 by asymptotic n uses of the network.
On the other hand, secure quantum network codes have been designed by Owari et al. [8] and Kato et al. [9] . However, the codes in [8] , [9] only keep secrecy from the malicious adversary but do not guarantee the correctness of the transmitted state if there is an attack. Moreover, this code depends on the network topology and requires classical communication.
In this paper, to resolve these problems and as a natural quantum extension of the secure classical network codes [13] , [16] , we present a quantum network code which is secret and correctable. Since we take a similar method to [13] , [16] , our code consists only of an end-to-end code without node operation controls and transmits a state by multiple n uses of the quantum network. When the network transmission rate is m 0 and the maximum number m 1 of the attacked channels satisfy m 1 < m 0 /2, our code transmits quantum information of the rate m 0 − 2m 1 with high fidelity by asymptotic n uses of the network. Since the high fidelity of the transmitted quantum state guarantees the secrecy of the transmission [17] , the secrecy of our code is guaranteed.
There are several notable properties in our code. First, our code is universal in the sense that the code construction does not depend on the network topology and the particular node operations. Instead, we place two constraints on the network topology and node operations. That is, at every node, the number of incoming edges is the same as the number of outgoing edges, and, similarly to [13] , [16] but differently from [8] , [9] , every node operation is the application of an invertible matrix to basis states. Then, our code is constructed by using the constraints but without any knowledge of the network topology and operations. Secondly, our code can be constructed without any classical communication. Though a negligible rate secret shared randomness is necessary for our code construction, we attach a subprotocol for sharing the randomness by use of the quantum network, and therefore no classical communication or no assumption of shared randomness is needed. Thirdly, our code is secure from any malicious operation on m 1 channels if m 1 < m 0 /2. That is, when m 1 < m 0 /2, our code is secure from the strongest eavesdropper who knows the network topology and the network operations, keeps classical information extracted from the wiretapped states, and applies quantum operations on the attacking channels adaptively by her wiretapped information. Fourthly, when the network consists of parallel m 0 quantum channels, our code can be thought of as an error-tolerant quantum secret sharing [18] .
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II formally describes the quantum network and the attack model. Section III presents two main results of the paper, and compares our quantum network code with the quantum maximum distance separable (MDS) codes and quantum secret sharing. Based on the preliminaries in Section IV, Section V constructs our code when a negligible rate secret shared randomness is assumed. Section VI evaluates the performance of the code and shows that the entanglement fidelity of the code protocol is bounded by the sum of two error probabilities, called bit error probability and phase error probability. Section VII derives upper bounds of the bit error probability and phase error probability, respectively. Section VIII constructs our code without assuming any negligible rate secret shared randomness. Section IX analyzes the secrecy of our code. Section X is the conclusion of the paper.
II. QUANTUM NETWORK AND ATTACK MODEL
We give the formal description of our quantum network which is defined as a natural quantum extension of a classical network. The notations in the network and attack model are summarized in Table I , and an example of the quantum network is given in Fig. 1 .
A. Network Structure and Transmission
We consider the network described by a directed acyclic graph G m 0 = (V, E) where V is the set of nodes (vertices) and E is the set of channels (edges). The network G m 0 has one source node v 0 , intermediate nodes v 1 , …, v c (c := |V | − 2), and one sink node v c+1 , where the subscript represents the order of the information conversion. The source node v 0 and the sink node v c+1 have m 0 outgoing and incoming channels, respectively, and each intermediate node v t has the same number k t ∈ {1, . . . , m 0 } of incoming and outgoing channels. For convenience, we define k 0 = k c+1 := m 0 .
The transmission on the network G m 0 is described as follows. Each channel transmits information noiselessly unless the channel is attacked, and each node applies an information conversion noiselessly at any time. At time 0, the source node transmits the input information along the m 0 outgoing channels. At time t ∈ {1, . . . , c}, the node v t applies an information conversion to the information from the k t incoming channels, and outputs the conversion outcome along the k t outgoing channels. At time c + 1, the sink node receives the output Propagation of malicious corruption in quantum network of Fig. 1 when Eve attacks the first channel (zigzagged) of the source node. The malicious corruption propagates by node operations along dashed channels. The target node receives 5 corrupted unit quantum systems.
information from the m 0 incoming channels. The detailed constraints of the transmitted information and information conversion are described in the following subsections.
The m 0 outgoing channels of the source node are numbered from 1 to m 0 , and after the conversion in the node v t , the assigned numbers are changed from k t incoming channels to k t outgoing channels deterministically.
B. Classical Network
To explain our model of the quantum network, we first consider the classical network. Every single use of a channel transmits one symbol of the finite field F q of order q. Hence, the information at each time is described by the vector space F m 0 q . We assume that the information conversion at each intermediate node is an invertible linear operation. That is, the information conversion at each intermediate node v t is written as an invertible k t × k t matrix A t acting only on the k t components of the vector space F m 0 q . Therefore, combining all the conversions, the relation between the input information x ∈ F m 0 q and the output information y ∈ F m 0 q can be characterized by an invertible m 0 × m 0 matrix K as
We extend the above discussion to the case of n network uses, i.e., the input and output informations are written as X = [x 1 , . . . , x n ] ∈ F m 0 ×n q and Y = [y 1 , . . . , y n ] ∈ F m 0 ×n q . We assume that every intermediate node v t applies the invertible matrix A t at n times and the matrix A t is not changed during the n transmissions. In addition, we assume that the inputs x 1 , . . . , x n are independently transmitted, i.e., y i = K x i holds for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Therefore, we have the relation
Next, we extend more to the case where a malicious adversary Eve attacks m a (≤ m 1 ) channels, i.e., fixed m a channels are attacked over n uses of the network. Since all the node operations are linear, there is a linear relation between the information on each channel and output information. That is, there are m a vectors w 1 , . . . , w m a in F m 0 q satisfying the following condition: when Eve adds the noise z 1 , . . . , z m a ∈ F n q on the m a attacked channels, the relation (2) is changed to
where W = [w 1 , . . . , w m a ] and Z = [z 1 , . . . , z m a ] . Here, the vectors w 1 , . . . , w m a are determined by the network topology and node operations. For the detail, see [9, Section 2.2] . Even in the case where Eve chooses the noise Z dependently of the input information X, the output information Y is always written in the form (3).
C. Quantum Network
We consider a natural quantum extension of the above classical network. Every single use of a quantum channel transmits a quantum system H of dimension q spanned by a basis {|x b | x ∈ F q } which is called the bit basis. In n uses of the network, the whole system to be transmitted is written as
To describe the node operations, we introduce the following unitary operations: for an invertible m × m matrix A and an invertible n × n matrix B, two unitaries L(A) and R(B) are defined as
Every node v t converts the information on the subsystem H ⊗k t ×n by applying the unitary L(A t ). If there is no attack, the operation of the whole network is the application of the unitary L(K ).
Next, we introduce Eve's attack model ( Fig. 2 ). Eve attacks fixed m a (≤ m 1 ) channels over n uses of the network. Whenever quantum systems are transmitted over the m a attacked channels, Eve can perform on the systems any trace preserving and completely positive (TP-CP) maps, measurements defined by positive operator-valued measure (POVM), or both. We assume that Eve's operations can be adaptive on the previous measurement outcomes and Eve knows the network topology and all node operations.
Consider the entire network operation with malicious attacks on channels. Then, the network structure F is characterized by the network topology G m 0 = (V, E), node operations A = (A 1 , . . . , A c ), and the set E att ⊂ E of attacked channels, i.e., F := (G m 0 , A, E att ). Given a network structure F , Eve's strategy S n over n network uses determines the TP-CP map of the entire network operation. Therefore, we denote the entire network operation over n network uses as a TP-CP map
where F n denotes the network structure F is used n times. As a special case, if E att = ∅, we have [F n , S n ] = L(K )ρL(K ) † . Moreover, we define the set ζ (n) m 0 ,m 1 of all network structures and strategies of transmission rate m 0 without attacks, at most m 1 attacked channels, and block-length n as 
III. MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we present the two coding theorems with and without a negligible rate secret shared randomness. For any quantum network described in Section II, our code can be constructed only with the knowledge of m 0 , m 1 , and q, but without any specific knowledge of the node operations L(A t ) and the network topology G m 0 .
A. Main Idea in Our Code Construction
In order to explain the main idea of our code, we briefly introduce the classical network codes in [13] , [16] . In [13] , [16] , node operations are restricted to be linear operations. Therefore, malicious injections on channels form a subspace in the network output, in the same way as (3) . Then, the codes in [13] , [16] find the subspace of injections from the network output with the help of secret shared randomness between the sender and receiver. Finally, the codes recover the original message from the information not in the subspace of injections.
By the above method of the classical network codes in [13] , [16] , our quantum network code is designed in the following way. Since our quantum network in Section II is defined as a natural quantum extension of the classical networks in [13] , [16] , we can reduce the correctness of our code to that of two classical network codes which are defined on two bases of quantum systems (in Sections VI and VII-C). In this reduction, our quantum network code is sophisticatedly defined so that the two classical network codes are similar to the codes in [13] , [16] . A difficult point in our code construction is that the accessible information from the network output state is restricted since a measurement disturbs the quantum states, whereas the classical network codes [13] , [16] have access to all information of the network output. Our code circumvents this difficulty by attaching to the codeword the ancilla system on which the measurement outcome contains sufficient information for finding the subspace of injections.
B. Main Theorems
In this subsection, we present two coding theorems with and without a negligible rate secret shared randomness.
Before we state the two coding theorems, we formulate a quantum network code of block-length n. Let R s and R e be sets for the secret shared randomness and the private randomness parameters, respectively. Let H (n) code be a quantum system called the code space. Given (r s , r e ) ∈ R s × R e , an encoder is defined as a TP-CP map E (n) r s ,r e from H (n) code to H ⊗m 0 ×n , and a decoder is defined as a TP-CP map D (n) r s from H ⊗m 0 ×n to H (n) code . The parameter r s is assumed to be shared between the encoder and decoder but kept a secret to all others, and r e is a private randomnesses of the encoder. Then, a quantum network code is defined as
In order to evaluate the performance of a quantum network code C n , we consider the averaged protocol
where the sum is taken in the set R s × R e . If there is no confusion, we denote [C n , F n , S n ] by n . Then, the correctness and secrecy of the code is evaluated by the entanglement fidelity
of the completely mixed state ρ mix on H (n) code and the averaged protocol [C n , F n , S n ], where | is the maximally entangled state and ι R is the identity operator on the reference system. where n := [C n , F n , S n ], and the maximum is taken with respect to (F , S n ) in ζ (n ) m 0 ,m 1 which is defined in (6) . Notice that this code depends only on the rates m 0 and m 1 , and does not depend on the detailed structure F of the network. Section V gives the code realizing the performance mentioned in Theorem III.1. Sections VI and VII prove that the code in Section V satisfies the performance mentioned in Theorem III.1. Section IX shows that the condition (12) implies the secrecy of the code, by using the result of [17] .
Theorem III.1 (Quantum Network Code with Negligible Rate Secret Shared Randomness). Suppose that the sender and receiver can share any secret randomness of negligible size in comparison with the block-length. When m
Indeed, it is known that there exists a classical network code which transmits classical information securely when the number of attacked channels is less than a half of the transmission rate from the sender to the receiver [15] . Although Theorem III.1 requires secure transmission of classical information with negligible rate in order for shared randomness, the result [15] implies that such secure transmission can be realized by using our quantum network in bit basis states with the negligible number of times. Hence, as shown in Section VIII, the combination of the result [15] and Theorem III.1 yields the following theorem.
Theorem III.2 (Quantum Network Code without Classical Communication). When m 1 < m 0 /2, there exist a sequence {n } ∞ =1 with n → ∞ as l → ∞ and a sequence {C n } ∞ =1 of quantum network codes of block-lengths n such that
where n := [C n , F n , S n ], and the maximum is taken
C. Comparison Our Code With Quantum Error-Correcting Code and Quantum Secret Sharing
To compare with existing results, we consider the special case where the network consists of m 0 parallel channels (Table II) . The quantum maximum distance separable (MDS) code [19] of length m 0 works in this network even for the one-shot setting which means one use of the network. When m 1 < m 0 /4 and at most m 1 channels are corrupted, the quantum MDS code has the rate m 0 − 4m 1 and the error is zero. On the other hand, our code works with n uses of the same network, and the position of m 1 corrupted channels is assumed to be fixed over all network uses. Then, when m 1 < m 0 /2 and at most m 1 channels are corrupted, our code has the rate m 0 −2m 1 and the error goes to zero as the number n of network use goes to infinity.
On the other hand, our code has an advantage that it can be used in any networks defined in Section II without any modification of the code, whereas the quantum MDS code [19] works only in the network with m 0 parallel channels.
Our code applied for m 0 parallel channels can be thought of as an error-tolerant quantum secret sharing [18] . In errortolerant quantum secret sharing, a sender encodes a secret to m 0 shares and distributes the shares to m 0 players, and all players send their shares to the receiver. If m 0 − m 1 players are honest, even if the other m 1 players send maliciously corrupted shares, the receiver can recover the secret and the secret is not leaked to the malicious players. Our code implements this task if the majority of players are honest, i.e., m 1 < m 0 /2, which is the same for the error-tolerant quantum secret sharing scheme in [18] .
IV. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we prepare definitions and notations which are necessary for our code construction in Section V. In the remainder of this paper, we assume m a ≤ m 1 < m 0 /2.
A. Phase Basis
Let q = s t for a prime number s and a positive integer t. In the construction of our code, we will discuss operations on the phase basis {|z p } z∈F q which is defined as [20, Section 8.1.2]
for ω := exp(2πi /s) and tr y := Tr M y (∀y ∈ F q ). Here, the matrix M y ∈ F t ×t s is the multiplication matrix x ∈ F q → yx ∈ F q where the finite field F q is identified with the vector space F t s . The following Lemma IV.1 describes the application of the unitaries L(A) and R(A), defined in (4), to the phase basis states, and is proved in Appendix A.
Lemma IV.1. For any Z ∈ F m×n q and any invertible matrices
For convenience, we use notation
B. Block-Lengths and Extended Quantum System in Our Code
First, we define the sequence {n } ∞ =1 of block-lengths. For any positive integer , define four parameters α := max{ 5 log q , 1}, n := α ,
Then, we have
because
In the following, we construct our code only for any sufficiently large such that the condition n ≥ 3m 0 (19) holds, which is enough to discuss the asymptotic performance of the code. In our code, an extended quantum system H := H ⊗α is the unit quantum system for encoding and decoding operations. We identify the system H with the system spanned by 
and similarly to Lemma IV.1, for any Z ∈ F m×n q , we have
C. Notations for Quantum Systems and States
In this subsection, we introduce several notations for quantum states and systems. For the quantum system H ⊗m 0 ×n = (H ) ⊗m 0 ×n which is transmitted by n uses of the network, we use the following notation:
The tensor product state of |φ ∈ H
, the bit and phase basis states of
The k ×l zero matrix is denoted by 0 k,l , and |i, j := |i ⊗| j .
D. CSS Code in Our Quantum Network Code
In this subsection, we define a Calderbank-Steane-Shor (CSS) code [21] [22] [23] which is used in the construction of our quantum network code in Section V. A CSS code is defined from two classical codes C 1 and C 2 satisfying C 1 ⊃ C ⊥ 2 , where a classical code is defined as the set of codewords. Therefore, in order to define the CSS code used in our code, we define the following two classical codes: by identifying the set F
The classical codes C 1 and C 2 satisfy
Then, the CSS code is defined as CSS(C 1 ,
The above CSS code is used in our code construction.
V. CODE CONSTRUCTION WITH NEGLIGIBLE RATE SECRET SHARED RANDOMNESS
Now, we describe our quantum network code with the secret shared randomness of negligible rate by n network uses.
In our code, the encoder and decoder are determined depending on secret randomnesses. Let R e be the set of m 0 × m 0 invertible matrices over F q , R 1 be the finite field F q , and R 2 be the set of (m 0 − m 1 ) × m 0 matrices over F q of rank m 0 − m 1 . The private randomness R e of the encoder is uniformly chosen from R e . The secret shared randomness R s := (S, R 2 ) := ((S 1 , . . . , S 4m 0 ), (R 2,b , R 2, p )) between the encoder and decoder is uniformly chosen from
Note that the size of the shared secret randomness R s is less than log q |F 4m 0
which is the code space of the CSS code defined in Section IV-D. The encoder E (n ) R e ,R s is defined depending on R e and R s as an isometry quantum channel from H (n ) code to H ⊗m 0 ×n , and the decoder D (n ) R s is defined depending on R s as a TP-CP map from H ⊗m 0 ×n to H (n ) code . In the following subsections, we give the details of the encoder E 
For any input state |φ ∈ H (n ) code , the encoder E (n ) R e ,R s is described as follows.
Encode 1 (Check Bit Embedding)
Encode the input state |φ by an isometry map U R 2 1 : 
where I d is the d-dimensional identity matrix. Encode |φ 2 as
By the above three steps, the encoder E (n ) R e ,R s is written as the isometry map
For any input state |ψ ∈ (H ) ⊗m 0 ×n = H ⊗m 0 ×n , the decoder D (n ) R s is described as follows.
Decode 1 (Decoding of Encode 3) The inverse of R S
1 is derived from the shared randomness S as
. The bit and phase measurement outcomes are denoted as
where P b is the projection to the last m 0 − m 1 elements in F m 0 q and P p is the projection to the first m 0 − m 1 elements in F m 0 q . If the invertible matrix D b or D p does not exist, the decoder applies no operation and returns the transmission failure. If D b or D p is not unique, the decoder decides D b or D p deterministically depending
Finally, apply L (D b ) and L (D p ) to the system H C , and output the reduced state on
where the matrix ρ O b ,O p ,|ψ 1 and the unitary D
By the above two steps, the decoder D (n ) R s is written as the TP-CP map
. The performance of our code will be analyzed in Section VI.
VI. ANALYSIS OF OUR CODE
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the code in Section V. That is, we show that the code in Section V satisfies the conditions (10), (11) , and (12) in Theorem III.1.
First, we evaluate the size of the secret shared randomness and the rate of the code. The size of the secret shared randomness R s is less than log q |F 4m 0
which scales with the log-order of the block-length n . Therefore, the secret shared randomness is negligible, i.e., the condition (10) is satisfied. Moreover, since the dimension of the code space H
, the rate of our code is m 0 − 2m 1 , i.e., the condition (11) is satisfied.
Next, we evaluate the correctability of the code. That is, we show that our code satisfies the condition (12), i.e.,
Recall that the averaged protocol is written in (8) as
and the entanglement fidelity is written in (9) as 
x bb x, x| and P 2 := z∈F m q |z,z pp z,z| where |z p is the complex conjugate of |z p . The equality of (23) holds from P 1 P 2 = || which is proved in Lemma B.2.
The two terms in (24) are error probabilities with respect to the bit and phase bases, respectively, in the following sense. Define the bit error probability of n as the average probability that a bit basis state |x b ∈ H (n ) code is the input state of n but the bit basis measurement outcome on the output state is not x. Since the bit error probability is evaluated as (bit error probability)
Tr P 1 ·( n ⊗ι R (|x,x bb x,x|)) = Tr n ⊗ ι R (||)(I − P 1 ), the bit error probability is equal to the first term of (24). Similarly, the second term Tr n ⊗ ι R (||)(I − P 2 ) of (24) is the phase error probability of n which is the average probability that a phase basis state is the input of n but the phase basis measurement outcome on output is incorrect. Therefore, we can bound the entanglement fidelity as 1 − F 2 e (ρ mix , n ) ≤ (bit error probability) + (phase error probability). (25)
The bit and phase error probabilities of our code are evaluated by the following lemma, which is proved in Section VII.
Lemma VI.1. Let C n be the quantum network code constructed in Section V and suppose that the randomness R s of C n is shared secretly between the encoder and decoder. For any (F , S n ) ∈ ζ (n ) m 0 ,m 1 defined in (6), the bit and phase error probabilities of [C n , F n , S n ] are evaluated as
By combining Eq. (25) and Lemma VI.1, we have the following inequality:
From the condition (18) , and since the condition (18) implies lim →∞ n /q = 0, the condition (12) is satisfied.
To summarize, the code in Section V satisfies the conditions (10), (11) , and (12) in Theorem III.1. Thus, Theorem III.1 is proved.
VII. BIT AND PHASE ERROR PROBABILITIES
In this section, we prove Lemma VI.1, that is, we bound separately the bit and phase error probabilities of n . Before we prove Lemma VI.1, we prepare notations and lemmas in Sections VII-A and VII-B.
A. Notations
In correspondence with the notations in Section IV-C, for any positive integer k and any matrix X ∈ F k×n q , we denote
If k = m 0 , for any X ∈ {A, B, C}, we denote
We denote by Pr R [ A(R) ] the probability that the random variable R satisfies the condition A, and by Pr R [ A(R)|B(R)] the conditional probability that the variable R satisfies the condition A under the condition B.
B. Lemmas for Derivation of Bit and Phase Error Probabilities
The first lemma is a variant of [16, Lemma 5] .
Lemma VII.1. Let V be a vector space, and W 1 and W 2 be subspaces of V. Suppose the following two conditions (A) and (B) hold.
Then, the following two statements hold.
For any bijective linear map A from W 1 to W 3 , there exists an invertible matrix D on V such that
where P W 3 is the projection to the subspace W 3 .
Proof: From the condition (A), there exists an invertible matrix D on V such that Du = Au ∈ W 3 and Dv ∈ W ⊥ 3 for any u ∈ W 1 and v ∈ W 2 . Then, the map D satisfies (28), which implies the condition (C). Moreover, the condition (B) guarantees that the condition (C) implies the condition (D).
In addition, we also prepare the following two lemmas.
Lemma VII.2. For any positive integers n 0 ≥ n 1 + n 2 , fix an n 0 -dimensional vector space V over F q and an n 1 -dimensional subspace W ⊂ V, and let R be the set of n 2 -dimensional subspaces of V. When the choice of R ∈ R follows the uniform distribution, we have
where the big-O notation is with respect to the prime power q which goes to infinity.
Proof: The probability Pr[W ∩ R = {0}] is the same as the probability to choose n 2 linearly independent vectors so that they do not intersect with W, which is done by the following method: choose v 1 from V \ W, and for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,
by the mathematical induction. Therefore, we have
Lemma VII.3. For any positive integer n > 3m 0 ,
where the maximum is with respect to any nonzero vector x ∈ F n q , and the random variable S = (S 1 , . . . , S 4m 0 ) and the matrix R S 1 are defined in Section V. The proof of Lemma VII.3 is given in Appendix C.
C. The Analysis of Protocol After Bit Basis Measurement
Before we prove the upper bound (26) for the bit error probability, we analyze the protocol when any bit basis state
code is the input state of the code. In the following, the parameter (F , S n ) ∈ ζ (n ) m 0 ,m 1 for the network operation is fixed but arbitrary.
In this case, the sender sends E , where [F n , S n ] is defined in (5) . The receiver applies the decoder D (n ) R s and, finally, performs the bit basis measurement to the output state of the decoder.
Note that the bit basis measurement to the output state of the decoder commutes with the decoding operation D code is equivalent to the process of performing the bit basis measurement on (H ) ⊗m 0 ×n and then applying the classical decoding which corresponds to the quantum decoder D (n ) R s . Therefore, we adopt the latter method to calculate the bit error probability.
Let Y ∈ F 
By Decode 1, the matrix Y is decoded as (20) is written as
By Decode 2, the matrix Y 1 is decoded as
Though the decoding succeeds if Y C2 2 = M, we evaluate instead the probability that
we evaluate the probability of
Then, the decoding success probability is lower bounded by the probability that (36) holds.
D. Upper Bound of Bit Error Probability
In this subsection, we derive the upper bound (26) for the bit error probability in Lemma VI.1.
Apply Lemma VII.1 to the following case:
where W b is the image of the projection P b defined in (20) . 
where the probability of (A') depends on the random variable R e and that of (B') depends on random variables R e and R s = (S, R 2 ). That is, the evaluation of the bit error probability is reduced to the evaluation of the probability that both conditions (A') and (B') hold.
In the remainder of this subsection, we will prove the following lemma.
Lemma VII.4. The following inequalities hold:
Then, by combining the inequality (38) with Lemma VII.4, we obtain the desired upper bound (26) for the bit error probability. Bound (39) for Pr R e [(A')]: Apply Lemma VII.2 to the case V := F m 0 q , W := ImW , and R := ImK R e | W b . In this case, we have n 1 = rankW ≤ rank W Z ≤ rank W ≤ m a ≤ m 1 and n 2 = rankK R e | W b = m 0 − m 1 . Therefore, Lemma VII.2 implies the desired inequality (39).
1) Proof of Lower
2) Proof of Lower Bound (40) for Pr R e ,R s [(B')|(A')]: We derive the lower bound (40) for Pr R e ,R s [(B')|(A')], by three steps. In the following, we assume the condition (A').
Step 1: First, we give one necessary condition for (B') and calculate the probability that the necessary condition is satisfied. The condition (B') is equivalent to
On the other hand, the following inequality holds from rank(A + B) ≤ rank A + rank B and rank(AB) ≤ min{rank A, rank B} for any matrices A and B:
Therefore, the following condition is a necessary condition for (B'):
The condition (45) holds if and only if x W ((R S 1 ) −1 ) A = 0 1,m 0 holds for any x ∈ F m 0 q such that x W = 0 n ,1 . Apply Lemma VII.3 to all (q ) rankW vectors in {x W = 0 n ,1 | x ∈ F m 0 q }, and then we have
Step 2: In this step, we evaluate the conditional probability that (B') holds under the conditions (A') and (45), i.e., Pr R e ,R s [(B')|(45) ∩ (A')].
Recall that the vectors u k , v k ∈ F m 0 q for k = 1, . . . , m 0 are defined by (37) as (1) , . . . , v i(m 2 ) ) = rankW . Note that the condition (B') holds if the m 2 vectors u i(1) + v i(1) , . . . , u i(m 2 ) + v i(m 2 ) are linearly independent. Moreover, the condition (A') guarantees that the m 2 vectors u i(1) +v i(1) , . . . , u i(m 2 ) +v i(m 2 ) are linearly independent if the following condition holds:
where (1) , . . . , u i(m 2 ) ]x = 0 m 0 ,1 ,
That is, we have the inequality Then, we evaluate the probability that (47) holds. It follows from the definitions of vectors u 1 , . . . , u m 0 , v 1 , . . . , v m 0 and the index function i that
This implies dim S ⊥ u +dim S ⊥ v ≥ m 2 , and therefore (47) holds only if
We calculate the conditional probability that (47) holds by the following relation:
Applying Lemma VII.2 with (n 0 , W,
Moreover, the following inequality is proved in Appendix D: 
Step 3: From the two inequalities (46) and (53), the probability Pr R e ,R s [(B')|(A')] is evaluated as
Thus, we obtain the inequality (40).
E. Phase Error Probability
Since Lemma IV.1 implies that coding and node operations are considered as classical linear operations even in the phase basis, we can apply similar analysis to the phase basis transmission as in Sections VII-C and VII-D.
Consider the situation that any phase basis state |M p ∈ H (n ) code is encoded and transmitted through the quantum network. In the same way as the bit basis states, we analyze the case that the receiver performs the phase basis measurement on (H ) ⊗m 0 ×n first, and then applies the decoding operations. After the phase basis measurement on (H ) ⊗m 0 ×n , the measurement outcome Y ∈ F m 0 ×n q is written similarly to (32) as
is a matrix such that rankW ≤ m 1 and
, and
. By the decoder, the matrix Y is decoded as
Consider applying Lemma VII.1 in the following case:
where W p is the image of the projection P p defined in (20) . 
Therefore, by combining inequalities (55), (56) and (57), we obtain the upper bound (27) of the phase error probability in Lemma VI.1.
VIII. SECURE QUANTUM NETWORK CODE WITHOUT CLASSICAL COMMUNICATION
In the secure quantum network code given in Theorem III.1, we assumed that the encoder and decoder share the negligible rate randomness R s secretly. The secret shared randomness can be realized by secure communication. The paper [15] where P err is the error probability and I (M; E) is the mutual information between the message M ∈ F k 2 and the Eve's information E.
By attaching the protocol of Proposition VIII.1 as a quantum protocol, we can share the negligible rate randomness secretly as the following proof of Theorem III.2.
Proof of Theorem III.2: Since the protocol of Proposition VIII.1 can be implemented with the quantum network by sending bit basis states instead of classical bits, the following code satisfies the conditions of Theorem III.2.
In the same way as (17), we choose α := 5 log q , n ,1 := /α , n ,1 := αn ,1 , q := q α for any sufficiently large such that α > 0 and n ,1 > 3m 0 . For the implementation of the code given in Section V with the block-length n ,1 and the extended field of size q , the sender and receiver need to share the secret randomness which consists of 4m 0 + 2m 0 (m 0 − m 1 ) elements of F q . Hence, using the protocol of Proposition VIII.1 with (c 0 , c 1 , c 2 ) := (m 0 , m 1 , m 1 ), the sender secretly sends k = (4m 0 + 2m 0 (m 0 − m 1 )) log 2 q bits to the receiver, which is called the preparation protocol. To guarantee that the error of the preparation protocol goes to zero, we choose β = 2 log q log 2 . Since k is evaluated as k = (4m 0 + 2m 0 (m 0 − m 1 )) log 2 q = (4m 0 + 2m 0 (m 0 − m 1 ))5 log q log 2 q ≤ 5(4m 0 +2m 0 (m 0 −m 1 )) log 2 , we have P err ≤ O(log 2 /(log 2 ) 2 ) → 0. Also, the preparation protocol requires n ,2 = kβm 0 (m 0 − m 1 + 1) network uses. Finally, we apply the code given in Theorem III.1 with the block-length n ,1 and the above chosen α and q .
The block-length of this code is n = n ,1 + n ,2 . Since n ,1 = () and n ,2 ≤ m 0 (m 0 − m 1 + 1)5(4m 0 + 2m 0 (m 0 − m 1 )) log 2 · 2 log q log 2 , we have n ,2 /n → 0 and n ,1 /n → 1. Therefore, Theorem III.1 guarantees the conditions (14) and (15) , and this code do not assume any shared randomness, i.e, (13) is satisfied. Thus, this code realizes the required conditions.
IX. SECRECY OF OUR CODE
In this section, we show that the condition (12) in Theorem III. 1 and (15) as follows, where |ϕ is a purification of the state ρ, ι R is the identity channel to the reference system, and κ E is the channel to the environment. When the input state ρ x is generated subject to the distribution p x , the mutual information between the input system and the environment is given
, which is upper bounded by H e (κ, x p x ρ x ). On the other hand, the entropy exchange is upper bounded by the entanglement fidelity as [17] H e (ρ, κ) ≤ h(F 2 e (ρ, κ)) + (1 − F 2 e (ρ, κ)) log(d − 1) 2 , (58) where h( p) is the binary entropy defined as h( p) := p log p + (1 − p) log(1 − p) for 0 ≤ p ≤ 1 and d is the dimension of the input space of κ. Hence, applying the inequality (58) to an arbitrary averaged protocol n and the completely mixed state ρ mix , because d = dim H (n ) code = O q (m 0 −2m 1 )n in our code, the condition (12) leads that the entropy exchange of the averaged protocol is asymptotically 0, i.e., there is no leakage in the averaged protocol. Thus, the asymptotic correctability (12) also guarantees the secrecy of the code in Theorems III.1 and III.2.
X. CONCLUSION
We have presented an asymptotically secret and correctable quantum network code as a quantum extension of the classical network codes given in [13] , [16] . To introduce our code, the network is constrained that the node operations are invertible linear operations to the basis states. When the transmission rate of a given network is m 0 without attack and the maximum number of attacked channels is m 1 , by multiple uses of the network, our code achieves the rate m 0 − 2m 1 asymptotically without any classical communication. Our code needs a negligible rate secret shared randomness but it is implemented by attaching a known secure classical network communication protocol [15] to our quantum network code. In the analysis of the code, we only considered the correctability because the secrecy is guaranteed by the correctness of the code protocol. The correctability is obtained analogously to the classical network codes [13] , [16] but by evaluating the bit and phase error probabilities separately.
One remaining task is to show whether our code rate m 0 − 2m 1 is optimal or not. As a first step to discuss this problem, we may consider the quantum capacity when the network topology, node operations, and m 1 corrupted channels are fixed. This problem is remained as a future study. 
Next, consider F n q as an n-dimensional row vector space over F q . For R (1) (B) := x∈F n q |x B bb x| and z ∈ F n q , we have
APPENDIX B PROOF OF (23) In this section, we show Lemmas B.1 and B.2 which shows the relationship between two maximally entangled states and projections P 1 , P 2 defined by the bit and the phase bases.
Define the following maximally entangled states with respect to the bit and phase bases:
We use the inner product (·, ·) defined in (59) for the proofs.
Proof: The lemma is proved as follows:
where the first equality in (60) holds because
From the above lemma, we denote | := | 1 = | 2 . Eq. (23) is proved by the following lemma. Lemma B.2. P 1 P 2 = P 2 P 1 = ||.
APPENDIX C PROOF OF LEMMA VII.3
We use the following lemma [13, Claim 5] to prove Lemma VII.3.
Lemma C.1 ( [13, Claim 5] ). Suppose independent m random variables S 1 , . . . , S m ∈ F q are uniformly chosen in F q and define the random matrix Q ∈ F l×m q as Q i, j := (S j ) i . For any row vectors x ∈ F m q and y ∈ F l q \{0 1,l } (l ≥ m), we have
Now, we prove Lemma VII.3. Proof of Lemma VII. 3 :
be a nonzero row vector. From the definition of R S 1 , we have the relations
(63) The inequality (30) is proved as follows. The relation (62) implies that the condition x((R S 1 ) −1 ) A = 0 1,m 0 holds in the following cases. In each case, the probability for x((R S 1 ) −1 ) A = 0 1,m 0 is calculated by Lemma C.1 as follows. 1) If x C = 0 1,n −2m 0 , the inequality (61) for Q := Q 1 implies
2) If x B = 0 1,m 0 and x C = 0 1,n −2m 0 , the inequality (61) for Q := Q 4 implies
3) If x A = 0 1,m 0 , x B = 0 1,m 0 , and x C = 0 1,n −2m 0 , the probability that (62) holds is zero. Since the inequality n > 3m 0 holds from (19) , we have m 0 q m 0 < n − 2m 0 q m 0 .
Therefore, we obtain the inequality (30) in Lemma VII.3.
Next, we show the inequality (31) as follows. The relation (63) implies that the condition x([R S 1 ] −1 p ) B = 0 1,m 0 holds in the following cases. In each case, the probability for x([R S 1 ] −1 p ) B = 0 1,m 0 is calculated by Lemma C.1 as follows. 1) If x C = 0 1,n −2m 0 , the inequality (61) for Q := Q 2 implies
2) If x A = 0 1,m 0 and x C = 0 1,n −2m 0 , the inequality (61) for Q := Q 3 implies
3) If x A = 0 1,m 0 , x B = 0 1,m 0 , and x C = 0 1,n −2m 0 , the probability that (63) holds is zero. Therefore, from the inequality (64), we obtain the inequality (31) in Lemma VII.3.
APPENDIX D PROOF OF (52)
From dim S ⊥ u = m 2 − rank[u i (1) , . . . , u i(m 2 ) ], we have Pr dimS ⊥ u = rankW = Pr rank[u i (1) ,. . .,u i(m 2 ) ] =rank R 2,b .
Since 
Therefore, (52) holds with probability at least 1 − O(1/q ).
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